Iran Military Network Smuggles Hardware Past US Blockade 29-Oct

Iran has established a covert network of military agencies capable of globally importing military hardware, having successfully smuggled at least $2 billion worth of equipment, explosives, and heavy-duty trucks since January 2025. This operation has effectively evaded the US naval blockade and Western sanctions, as reported in a Media investigation. Central to this intricate system are more than 5,000 agencies, many of which are affiliated with the Ministry of Defense (MOD), particularly tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and elite-controlled business conglomerates known as bonyads.

Iran Military Network Bypasses US Blockade

Iran Military The financial and operational activities of these agencies are documented in bills of lading and shipping records dating back to 2016. This extensive network raises critical questions about how the IRGC continues to replenish its missile and drone stockpiles amid ongoing military engagements. In an investigation covering the period from January 2025 to June 2026, a specific agency, MOD 346428, heavily imported significant amounts of rocket propellants, explosives, and various weapons components essential for the manufacture of drones and missiles. The agency also acquired heavy-duty trucks that could function as missile launchers.

Iran Military The importation involved transportation methods via land, sea, and air, with a substantial portion of these materials traced back to China, Russia, and Germany. This analysis of the MOD network is grounded in extensive documentation, including Iranian bank and government records, corporate filings, and import data, which collectively highlight the scale and sources of these military-related imports amidst the ongoing conflict. The intelligence agencies of Iran are officially registered at the same address as the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), with an incorporation date of February 11, 1979, coinciding with Ayatollah Khomeini rise to power following the overthrow of the monarchy.

Iran Military However, research indicates that most of these agencies were actually established in 2013, during a period when Iran was grappling with severe sanctions that significantly reduced its crude oil exports and weakened its currency. According to an investigation by Media in conjunction with the Israeli-American risk consultancy 240 Analytics, these agencies constitute a critical element of Iran military procurement and their strategies for circumventing international sanctions. They operate through a complex network of intermediaries and foreign shell companies, referred to as trustees, utilizing the revenue generated from illicit oil sales to procure essential goods for the state. This infrastructure reveals the intricate mechanisms Iran employs to sustain its military capabilities despite ongoing economic pressures.

Iran Military Senior military leaders associated with Iran ballistic missile and drone development programs utilize a particular network. Records indicate that phone numbers tied to 91 of these agencies are also found in documentation from Bank Sepah, which is state-operated and linked to personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who maintain accounts there. Notably, this group includes at least two commanders whom the United States has accused of engaging in abuses against civilian protesters.

Iran Military Iran military has faced numerous US sanctions for decades, yet there is no evidence that the specific agencies mentioned in related documents have been designated by Western governments, according to a Media investigation. Miad Maleki, a former senior official at the US Treasury Department who was involved in formulating these sanctions, emphasized that the situation represents a critical lifeline for the Iranian regime military efforts, both in the ongoing conflict and historically. He characterized it as a comprehensive ecosystem supporting the trade operations of the Iranian military.

This is the complete ecosystem of the Iranian military trade business

Iran Military This document outlines the intricate ecosystem surrounding the Iranian military trade operations, highlighting significant players and mechanisms involved. Miad Maleki, a former senior official at the US Treasury, played a crucial role in shaping the US sanctions against Iran. The Iranian weapons import network has been vital in supplying essential raw materials for the production of missiles and drones, which have enabled Iran to carry out precise attacks on Gulf energy assets. These military actions are part of Iran strategy to mitigate the impacts of American military pressure.

Furthermore, reports from Media indicate that Iran has been able to withstand US sanctions by leveraging cryptocurrency exchanges and illegal gambling networks to generate illicit revenue. This economic maneuvering has allowed the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to reinforce its control over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, while also contributing to a new era of repression in the country as a result of ongoing conflicts. Maleki, an expert on Iranian sanctions and weapons, along with three others, reviewed Media’ findings, confirming that many identified materials could be utilized in Iran missile and drone initiatives.

Iran Military Despite inquiries, the Iranian government and its associated companies, including Tehran UN delegation in Geneva and the presidency, did not respond to specific requests for comments. In light of the Media report, a spokesperson for the U.S. Treasury Department stated that the United States has effectively cut off the Iranian regime economic channels. The spokesperson emphasized that while the regime might attempt to circumvent the stringent sanctions to fund its military and weaponry and gain access to foreign currency, U.S. measures are well in place and proactive.

Iran Military Trade Network

Iran Military Media conducted a thorough tracking of materials by cross-referencing approximately 19,000 import records alongside shipping documents, social media footage, and state media outputs. Their analysis revealed that most items imported into Iran were categorized as military equipment and exempt from customs duties. The experts highlighted that many of these materials, including explosives, possess dual-use capabilities, implying potential civilian applications. Additionally, the Wall Street Journal provided details on shipments from China, reported on September 23.

The covert military agencies in Iran operate a parallel foreign-trade system that circumvents the formal global economy, allegedly allowing the country to finance its military hardware with proceeds from illicit oil sales. According to Maleki, a former associate director of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, this operation ensures that financial transactions largely avoid international scrutiny, thereby evading sanctions. In fact, 97% of the shipments reviewed by Media were conducted without any currency transfer; instead, trusted intermediaries in the Iranian diaspora utilized cash stored in foreign banks to purchase military goods and subsequently ship them back to Iran.

Iran Military Among the beneficiaries of this clandestine network is the military unit responsible for Iran ballistic missile program. Additionally, Sahara Thunder, a company manufacturing and supply of drones to Russia sanctioned by the US in 2024 for its role in the Ukraine conflict also utilizes this operation. The identification of these Iranian military units was achieved by Media and 240 Analytics through meticulous cross-referencing of import data with corporate registry documents and information collected on WikiIran.

Media has been unable to identify the individuals behind WikiIran, a website dedicated to collecting leaked documents from the Islamic Republic. The site claims to be operated by Iranians who oppose the government and have been “forced into exile.” In the first half of this year, import data reveals that deliveries to the region included $1.9 million worth of detonators, extensive quantities of explosives, components for aircraft engines, materials for rocket fuel, and heavy-duty launch vehicles. These items are recognized by weapons and sanctions experts as essential for constructing and launching ballistic missiles and drones, notably the Shahed series.

Iran Military The document discusses the substantial efforts by Iran to enhance its military capabilities, particularly through the expansion of its drone and missile fleet. Peter Salisbury, an adjunct assistant professor at Columbia University, asserts that the scale of these developments indicates a robust industrial capacity for arms production in Iran. He emphasizes the resilience and adaptability of Iran supply chain, which has identified new routes for acquiring necessary materials.

How Military Agencies Move Hardware

Iran Military The context is framed against the backdrop of ongoing conflicts, with both the United States and Israel targeting Iranian missile and drone production sites since the onset of the current war on February 28. While damage assessments from these strikes remain unclear, Iranian military operations continue unabated, posing threats to regional stability, including attacks on neighboring countries and maritime targets in the Strait of Hormuz. The logistics of these military efforts include materials entering Iran via varied routes, including cargo ships from Russia across the Caspian Sea, truck shipments from Central Asia, and air freight from China.

Iran Military This complex network of supply chains has been corroborated by data from platforms like ImportGenius. In a response to inquiries about these findings, China Foreign Ministry denied any knowledge of the situation, expressing opposition to what it described as attempts to wrongly associate China with regional conflicts or to damage its reputation. Russia Defense Ministry, the White House, and CENTCOM have not commented on recent developments regarding Iran military procurement efforts. Iran is actively acquiring advanced machinery that could enable the domestic production of military equipment, as evidenced by import data up to June.

The items being purchased include sophisticated computer-controlled lathes, electron-beam furnaces, and particle accelerators, all of which serve industrial purposes but can also be repurposed for manufacturing military components such as drone and missile bodies. In a related remark on October 12, US President Donald Trump expressed skepticism about claims that China and Russia are assisting Iran in its military endeavors. He stated on social media that if such support existed, it would be at a minimal level and emphasized his belief that it would be quickly observed, asserting that both countries have too much to lose in such a scenario.

Iran Military Since the onset of the war, data indicates that Iran military has procured approximately $27 million worth of goods that were recorded as having originated from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), predominantly arriving via maritime routes. Throughout May, Iran has deliberately targeted UAE infrastructure and has continued assaults on its crude tankers using drones and missiles.

Iran Military The latest documented shipment from the UAE, categorized as electronics, occurred on June 27, just nine days after the United States announced a suspension of its naval blockade, which was reinstated in mid-July and remains active. The UAE government has not provided any comments regarding these shipments. The analysis of this situation involved arms experts, including Maleki, Henry Thompson, Wolf-Christian Paes, and Damien Spleeters, with the latter being the founder of Heimdall, an organization concentrating on illicit supply chains and weapons acquisition.

Iran Entry Points for Military Imports

Iran Military Iran has developed a significant military business empire, which has reportedly imported goods worth at least $2 billion. This activity continues amidst ongoing conflicts, including the current year war. The entry points for these military imports illustrate the strategic avenues through which Iran is enhancing its military capabilities.

The Plumbing

Iran Military In June 2025, Noam Binstok, a senior analyst at 240 Analytics, uncovered a network of numbered agencies linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which play a crucial role in evading global sanctions. While analyzing a trove of Bank Sepah documents sourced from Telegram and WikiIran, Binstok highlighted the considerable financial flow through these entities, noting that they had gone unnoticed until now. Bank Sepah, an Iranian bank that manages salary and pension disbursements for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), did not respond to inquiries about the data breach.

The breach was claimed by a group known as Codebreakers, which subsequently announced additional hacks targeting Iranian government information. WikiIran, which plays a role in disseminating the hacked data, confirmed the authenticity of the materials and their verified origins via internal and external contacts in Iran, responding to questions from Media regarding the situation. This investigation sheds light on the clandestine financial mechanisms utilized for sanctions evasion, emphasizing the scale and implications of the funds involved. 240 Analytics was established to provide services that assist companies and governments in evaluating potential business partners and clients.

Iran Military The founder, Binstok, anticipated that analyzing certain documents would illuminate Iran financial activities. Upon investigation, he discovered that a significant number of accounts were linked to agencies sharing a common naming convention. Each account began with the letters MOD representing VODJA in Farsi followed by a five- or six-digit number spelled out in full rather than numeric form. This peculiar pattern indicated that these accounts were likely related. The bank records, which were reviewed by Media, contained essential details such as the account holder name, various identification numbers, and account balances.

Iran Military Upon reviewing these records, Binstok was astonished by the sizeable balances found in the Sepah accounts, initially suspecting a clerical error due to the scale of the numbers. Specifically, he identified 36 agencies that maintained foreign exchange accounts collectively holding an impressive sum of $1.2 billion at the close of 2024. In addition, other accounts within the network held approximately $1.8 billion in local currency, averaging about $360,000 per account. This financial data offers significant insights into the operational structure and economic activities associated with these Iranian agencies.

The amount of money going through these agencies is staggering, and no one has noticed them before

Iran Military The text discusses significant findings related to financial transactions through various Iranian agencies identified by unique 11-digit government identity numbers. Binstok, juggling multiple commitments, initially paused his investigation but resumed it in August, discovering agencies involved in contraband oil sales and the acquisition of dual-use equipment. This prompted him to realize the broader implications of his research.

Iran Military The identification of these agencies in Iran corporate registry and their traceable activities, confirmed through shipping documents and import data reviewed by Media, provided a clearer view of how these entities facilitated Iran supply chain during the war. Among these agencies, MOD 346428 caught particular attention due to its purchases dating back to 2016, indicating a long-term operation that had previously gone unnoticed. The collaboration with Media enabled a more comprehensive mapping of this network, shedding light on the scale and complexity of the financing behind these activities.

Iran Military Over the years, the overseas purchases of MOD 346428 have shown a significant upward trend, increasing from $442 million in the 12 months ending March 2023 to $988 million in the subsequent year, thus positioning the agency among Iran top 10 importers according to customs statistics reported by Iranian media. A detailed analysis by Media covering the period from January 2025 to June 2026 revealed that MOD 346428 imported military hardware valued at $2.3 billion, based on records from ImportGenius.

Billions Flow Through Hidden Agencies

Iran Military Additionally, between January and April 2025, MOD 346428 imported 886 tonnes of chemicals through the Iranian port complex of Bandar Abbas, with the origin of these chemicals listed as China. The imports included sodium chlorates and other perchlorates, which are essential precursors for solid rocket fuel. Notably, three days after the last shipment of these materials, a significant explosion occurred at the port, highlighting potential risks associated with such imports.

Iran Military The April 26 explosion, which resulted in the deaths of at least 70 people and injured over 1,200, was attributed to the ignition of sodium perchlorate stored in dockside shipping containers. Iranian state media disclosed that the chemicals were held by Sina Port and Marine Services Development Co., a corporation owned by Bonyad Mostazafan, a vast foundation controlled by Iran supreme leader. The CEO of Sina at the time attributed the disaster to a “false statement” regarding the contents of a consignment, which had allegedly been delivered without proper documentation.

Iran Military The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Bonyad Mostazafan in 2020, alleging it operates as a charity while actually enriching the supreme leader and benefiting his allies. The foundation is led by Hossein Dehghan, who previously served as Iran defense minister from 2013 to 2017 and was the commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon during the 1983 bombing that killed 241 U.S. troops. The U.S. government holds Iran responsible for that attack.

Iran Military Despite a request for comment regarding the explosion and the operational agencies, Dehghan did not respond. Furthermore, investigations revealed that Iran has been importing materials suitable for missile fuel, in addition to heavy-duty trucks used by the military as camouflaged mobile missile launchers. An example includes the purchase of six Iveco Eurocargo trucks in autumn 2022 for €426,000 by an Iranian dealer in Italy, which were then shipped to a company in Dubai before being delivered to Bandar Abbas.

Between January 2025 and June 2026, MOD 346428 imported a total of 435 Iveco trucks, as indicated by the packing list stating these vehicles were eventually delivered to Sahara Thunder, a manufacturer and seller of drones. Despite efforts to reach out, Deilami did not provide any comments regarding this transaction. Utilizing satellite imagery and social media, Media was able to trace certain vehicles to a customs lot near Tehran in February 2025, corroborating their findings with unique Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs) to confirm their origins. Additionally, one Iveco truck was observed during a conflict when the US Central Command shared footage suggesting it was part of an attack on a concealed Iranian mobile missile launcher. Iran Military

However, it remains unclear whether this specific vehicle had been imported by MOD 346428; analysts from Janes, a UK-based defense intelligence firm, confirmed it was a model imported by Iran. In a statement regarding these findings, Iveco, the Italian manufacturer, emphasized that their official distributors are obligated to ensure their vehicles are not used for military, chemical, biological, or nuclear applications. The company outlined that they have established contractual safeguards to prevent their products from reaching “prohibited destinations, entities, or individuals.”

A Previously Overlooked Military Trade Network

Iran Military Iveco further noted that they lack control over any vehicles transferred or exported by third parties with whom they do not maintain direct contractual relationships. They affirmed that any presence of their vehicles in Iran fell outside their control and responsibility. The company also stated they had no record of a 2022 sale to Iranian parties in Italy and clarified that many trucks identified in the customs yard were intended for Central Asia instead. Using MOD 346428, Iran has imported numerous Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser trucks, which are modified by the IRGC and its proxies to mount heavy machine guns.

Video evidence from protests in early 2026 revealed security forces utilizing these modified vehicles in Tonkebon, northern Iran. Additionally, in January 2025, the MOD imported four Toyota Tundras, employed by the IRGC for transporting drones. Toyota has publicly stated that it does not conduct business in Iran, asserting that it was neither involved in nor aware of the reported purchases. Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, while not deeply commenting on the specifics of the Media investigation, indicated that it imposes strict controls regarding national security-related goods and conducts outreach to inform businesses about export regulations.

On February 9, 2026, a shipment containing 93 tonnes of unwrought Chinese titanium, suitable for missile airframes and rocket motor casings, docked at Bandar Abbas. Throughout February leading up to the onset of war on February 28, additional shipments included 268 tonnes of nitrocellulose and 276 tonnes of other chemicals from China, categorized under codes associated with perchlorate, essential for rocket propellant and explosives. Despite a blockade during the ongoing conflict, Iran military continued to import materials. Monthly import values initially fell by 47% to $54 million in March compared to the previous month, but by May, they surged to $77 million. Iran Military

Notably, a shipment of $1.9 million in Russian detonators, essential for triggering explosives in drones and missile warheads, arrived in June 2026, marking the fifth of similar Russian shipments, cumulatively amounting to $7.6 million worth since early 2025. Imports of military goods to Iran have not only stemmed from Russia and China, but also from European Union (EU) countries, despite sanctions targeting Iran Defense Ministry. An investigation revealed that significant shipments, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars, included trucks and airplane engine components, with $34 million worth specifically attributed to Iveco trucks from Germany and other EU nations.

Iran Military These imports were documented under the identification number MOD 346428, although many records lacked comprehensive descriptions, leading Media to depend on customs codes for content and origin identification without independent verification. A spokesperson for the EU emphasized that enforcement of sanctions is the responsibility of member states and noted ongoing scrutiny of Iran advancements in drone and missile technologies. Germany and Italy were contacted for comments but did not respond.

The Pink Drone

Iran Military The Pink Drone outlines the significant role of quasi-governmental foundations, or bonyads, in controlling Iran economy, particularly post-1979 Islamic Revolution. These entities are managed by Iran elite and were established using assets seized from the former royal family and other adversaries of the state. According to a 2013 Media investigation and various U.S. sanction documents, bonyads function as a means for the elite to maintain power, fostering patronage networks among loyal supporters. Iran Military

Iran Military Both U.S. and European sanctions have highlighted the bonyads’ involvement in the repression of Iranian citizens. A notable example is the Foundation for the Preservation of Relics and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, which is intricately linked to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and serves as a critical propaganda tool for the Islamic Republic. This foundation is responsible for promoting ideologies of resistance, sacrifice, jihad, and martyrdom, thus reinforcing the legitimacy of the regime. Iran Military

Iran Military In 2017, the foundation received four shipments of electronics and refrigeration units, which were documented to be associated with MOD 346428. The specific use of these materials remains unclear, yet the foundation leadership includes senior commanders from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), such as Brigadier General Hassan Shahvarpour, who commands elite troops in Khuzestan. Shahvarpour forces have a history of violence, including the deadly suppression of protests in Mahshahr in 2019, where at least 100 civilians were killed as military units fired upon unarmed crowds trying to escape.

The document paints a picture of systemic repression underpinned by these powerful foundations as they intertwine with Iran economic and political structures. A local human rights activist reported witnessing killings carried out by troops under Shahvarpour, who subsequently set fire to sugarcane fields where some fleeing protestors were hiding. This account was corroborated by another activist present during the incident. In 2020, the US imposed sanctions on Shahvarpour due to alleged human rights violations; despite this, a prominent cleric publicly supported him during a religious ceremony, stating that the sanctions were a “source of pride.” Iran Military

Iran Military In 2021, Shahvarpour solicited 50 billion rials, over $1 million at the official exchange rate, from a state-owned steel company to fund a new building for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Khuzestan. Documentation reviewed by Media indicated that the account intended for this fund transfer was associated with MOD 424000 and bore his signature. In early 2023, activists reported that Shahvarpour forces violently suppressed new protests in Khuzestan, part of a wider national uprising against Iran economic degradation.

Iran Military This unrest resulted in the deaths of thousands across the country, with tens of thousands arrested. Specifically in Khuzestan, activists documented 46 fatalities, mainly occurring on January 8 and 9, when the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) opened gunfire on protesters. Additionally, state media footage showcased Shahvarpour IRGC units parading through Khuzestan in white Toyota Tundras, vehicles commonly associated with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) network; one of these trucks was seen transporting a bright pink Shahed drone.

Summary

• Iran has reportedly used a network of more than 5,000 military-linked agencies to import at least $2 billion in military-related goods while circumventing US sanctions and the naval blockade.
• Investigative analysis of shipping records, bank documents, and import data identified major purchases of rocket-fuel chemicals, explosives, titanium, aircraft components, and heavy-duty trucks.
• The agency MOD 346428 reportedly imported $2.3 billion in military hardware between January 2025 and June 2026, with shipments linked to China, Russia, and European countries.
• Financial records suggest these agencies rely on intermediaries, foreign companies, and alternative payment arrangements to reduce international scrutiny of military procurement.
• The investigation also highlights links between military agencies, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and powerful foundations known as bonyads, raising concerns about sanctions enforcement and the potential military use of imported equipment.